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SESSION 9
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner  
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law 
The George Washington University
David J. Berteau  
President & CEO  
The Professional Services Council
I. UPSETTING THE APPLE CART: A NEW ADMINISTRATION, PERSPECTIVE, 
APPROACH, AND BASELINE. 
2017 is shaping up to be one of the least predictable years in modern memory. Few predicted that 
Donald Trump would succeed Barack Obama as President of the United States. More importantly, little or 
no program or contract planning revolved around that outcome. By the time of this conference, President 
Trump will have been inaugurated, but most senior appointees will not have been confirmed or even nomi-
nated. Looking ahead, our sense is that, quite simply, it would be folly to rely on pre-existing assumptions 
about government contracts or, for that matter, governance. The biggest questions revolve around what 
aspects – if any – of the status quo remain unchanged. Of course, related questions arise with regard to 
the pace and extent of change. But, no matter how you want to say it, we’ll begin with the words of the 
2016 Pulitzer Prize winning bard, Bob Dylan: the times, they are a-changin’…. Much more on this, below.
II. SPECULATING ON PROCUREMENT SPENDING: PLATEAU, RECOVERY, RESUR-
GENCE?
A. Good News? After the Bottom, Upward Motion. Attendees should be cheered to learn that 
2016 reversed the seven-year decline in federal procurement spending. By the time, we reached bottom, 
annual federal procurement spending had dropped by more than $100B. (Go ahead, read that again. It 
was a significant drop.) We have stopped falling, but are we now headed in the other direction?
The chart below summarizes this post-millennial procurement spending cycle. On first glance, it appears 
that the post-recession spending plunge has ended. Now the question is whether spending will stabilize, 
increase, or, of course, drop again. Here, this chapter continues past practice, taking a broader view of the 
spending picture to redefine the pie by including grant spending. In that context, the 2016 overall spend-
ing layouts – combining contracts and grants – appear quite robust, indeed, presenting the third highest 
total in this century (although, of course, these numbers have not been adjusted for inflation).
Reprinted from West Government ContraCts Year In revIeW CoverInG 2016 ConferenCe BrIefs, with per-
mission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2017. Further use without the permission of West is prohibited. 
For further information about this publication, please visit west.thomson.com/store, or call 800.328.9352.
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Federal Procurement and Grant Spending 2001-2016*
Fiscal 
Year
Procurement Spend-
ing (in Billions of $)
Grant Spending 
(in Billions of $)
Procurement & Grant Spend-
ing (Combined, in Billions of $)
2016 $462.8* $654.5* $1,117.3*
2015 $433.0 $616.8 $1,049.8
2014 $441.8 $603.4 $1,045.2
2013 $460.0 $521.6 $981.6
2012 $519.3 $543.1 $1,062.4
2011 $539.3 $572.6 $1,111.9
2010 $540.2 $623.2 $1,163.4
2009 $540.8 $675.6 $1,216.4
2008 $541.2 $420.7 $961.9
2007 $469.3 $430.2 $899.5
2006 $430.5 $490.0 $920.5
2005 $391.2 $441.7 $832.9
2004 $346.1 $450.1 $796.2
2003 $318.0 $493.7 $811.7
2002 $264.1 $406.3 $670.4
2001 $223.0 $330.8 $553.8
*FY 2016 figures reflect an estimate based upon preliminary reporting. See www.USASpending.gov.
Also, the total procurement spending amounts reported above, for every year, 2008-2015, changed – 
in some years, significantly – when compared to last year’s USASpending reports. Changes to prior 
years tend to be less statistically significant.
B. The Post-Millennial Trend Line? Too Early for Extrapolation? 
Regular attendees of this conference are familiar with this chapter’s cover-
age of the post-millennium federal procurement spending trend. The post-
millennial binge (before the 2008 economic crisis) was significant not only 
for its longevity but for its size. To review:
• In Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to just
over $223 billion.
• The following years, in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20
percent spending increases.
• After steady increases in the middle of the decade, we reached
an unprecedented plateau where federal procurement spending
stabilized at approximately $540 billion from Fiscal Years 2008
through 2011.
• In 2009, we experienced the first decrease in federal procurement
spending for well over a decade, but the decreases were statistically
insignificant (and it took a number of years for the data to catch
up). Indeed, much of the post-2008 panic seemed either premature
or an over-reaction, as, for a number of years, the only macro-level
spending effect was an absence of growth or expansion.
• In 2012, we finally experienced the first dramatic decline in spend-
ing and, then, a plunge below the (oh-so-dramatic) $500 billion
threshold in 2013.
• Two years later, procurement spending appeared to bottom out at
$433B, more than $100 billion below the 2008-2011 plateau.
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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• Last year saw a nearly seven percent increase in procurement 
spending (erasing two years’ worth of decreases), bringing the 
number back to the 2013 spending level.
• It’s worth paying attend to grants! Consistent with the trend 
this chapter has previously reported, in 2016, grant spending 
exceeded procurement spending, as it has for fourteen of the last 
sixteen years. And the gap is widening. For the last three years, the 
government expended 35-45 percent more dollars through grants 
than through contracts.
C. No Sequestration, Continuing Resolutions, A Half-Year Budget 
Cycle? Fortunately, despite some last minute drama, we did not experience 
the dramatic disruption of sequestration in 2016. For better or worse, Congress 
decided to kick the can down the street, failing to pass appropriations either 
before or even after the election. With a continuing resolution that runs through 
April 2017 for all but VA and MilCon, we worry about how Congress or the 
agencies execute a 5 month appropriations. Many, including PSC, argued that 
their time and energy would be better spent planning for the following (full) 
fiscal year. None of this supports the kind of stable funding that facilitates ef-
ficient, long-term investment decisions and contractual relationships.  
D. The Future of Procurement Data: Something Better? A Global 
Standard? There is an evolving global conversation on open contracting data. 
“The Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) enables disclosure of data and 
documents at all stages of the contracting process by defining a common data 
model. It was created to support organisations [sic] to increase contracting 
transparency, and allow deeper analysis of contracting data by a wide range of 
users.” Open Contracting Data Standard at http://standard.open-contracting.
org/latest/en/. This is a much more far-reaching effort than simply improv-
ing the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) or USASpending data 
resources. The Open Data advocates envision global standards on what we 
generally refer to a single point of entry site – e.g., our www.AQUISITION.
Gov site, managed by GSA. But the open contracting data initiative aspires 
to encourage nations to publish data for each step of the contracting pro-
cess, create summary records for an overall contracting process, and make 
available re-useable objects, such as tender (or bid or proposal) information, 
line-items, amounts, milestones, documents etc. The United States, histori-
cally a leader on procurement transparency, is not driving the train on this 
and, arguably, is lagging behind. See, generally, Bill Would Require Posting 
Large Contracts Online, 58 GC ¶ 107; Congress Has Limited Visibility Into 
DOD Service Acquisitions, GAO Determines, 58 GC ¶ 67, GAO-16-119, DOD 
Service Acquisition: Improved Use of Available Data Needed to Better Man-
age and Forecast Service Contract Requirements, available at www.gao.gov/
assets/680/675276.pdf; The U.S. Government’s Open Data initiative at: www.
data.gov and https://project-open-data.cio.gov/. See also the Sunlight Founda-
tion’s Open Data Policy Guidelines, at https://sunlightfoundation.com/open-
dataguidelines/. Keep in mind that the leap from the (largely impenetrable) 
FPDS to USASpending derived from a private sector (OMB Watch) initiative. 
Time will tell how quickly the U.S. embraces this global movement.
III. FAREWELL TO BETTER BUYING POWER: A NEW  
APPROACH AT DOD 
A (dramatic) change of administrations ensures that there will be sig-
nificant leadership, managerial, and philosophical changes at the Defense 
NOTES
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Department. It is premature to anticipate what the defense acquisition 
leadership will look like, but some things are clear.
A. Whither the 809 Panel? Of course, we are curious what will hap-
pen, if anything, with the DoD 809 panel’s work product. See NDAA Section 
809 for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, which required the Secretary 
of Defense to establish an advisory panel on streamlining and codifying 
acquisition regulations. The massive study panel has been working on five 
target areas: (1) establishing and administering appropriate buyer and seller 
relationships; (2) improving the functioning of the system; (3) ensuring the 
continuing financial and ethical integrity of defense procurement programs; 
(4) protecting the best interests of DoD; and (5) eliminating any regulations 
that are unnecessary for the purposes described. Will there be an audience for 
the panel’s work? At a minimum, given the amount of energy expended, we 
hope the Panel publishes a summary report. See, generally, Vernon J. Edwards, 
The Department of Defense’s Section 809 Advisory Panel: Recommendations, 
30 N&CR ¶ 52 (October 2016) (offering 15 recommendations, including: “Free 
the DOD from the [FAR] system and let it write its own Defense Acquisition 
Regulation[;].... Raise the simplified acquisition threshold to $1 million and 
the micro-purchase threshold to $25,000[;]... Take the rules and procedures 
for simplified acquisitions out of the FAR (or a new DAR) and put them in a 
separate publication[;] ... Prohibit price competition (evaluation of proposed 
estimated costs) in the award of cost-reimbursement contracts[;] ... and 
[include] at least one knowledgeable Gen Xer, Gen Yer, and maybe even a 
Millennial.... They’re going to be in charge in a very few years, if they aren’t 
running a contracting office or contracting activity already. They probably 
have a lot more recent working-level experience with the current regulations 
than the named appointees.”)
B. NDAA Eliminates USD(AT&L). In the Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17) 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress, led by the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, reversed the central recommendation of the 
1986 Packard Commission and eliminated the position of Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Logistics, replacing it with two new under 
secretaries, one for research and engineering, and one for acquisition and 
logistics. See http://www.dtic.mil/congressional_budget/pdfs/FY2017_pdfs/
AUTH/CRPT-114HRPT-S2943-JES.pdf. Congress gave DoD a year to plan 
these new organizations with little specific guidance. In reality, any changes 
to the statute will need to be developed quickly if they are to be included in 
the FY18 NDAA, which will be marked up in the next few months. 
C. DoD Continues Its Effort to Analyze Metrics. For the last few 
years, these materials suggested that some of the most thought-provoking 
reading was found in DoD’s nascent performance, outcome, or metrics, ini-
tiative. AT&L Issues First Defense Acquisition System Performance Report, 
55 GC ¶ 214, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/Report_on_the_Perfor-
mance_of_the_Def_Acq_System.pdf; AT&L Releases Second Annual DOD 
Acquisition Assessment, 56 GC ¶ 208; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisi-
tion System: 2014 Annual Report, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/
Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf; AT&L’s Third DOD Ac-
quisition Assessment Scrutinizes Subcontractor Margins, Program Baselines, 
57 GC ¶ 309; and now: AT&L’s Fourth DOD Acquisition Assessment Sees Low 
Rates Of Cost Growth, Protest Sustainment, 58 GC ¶ 382, available at http://
bbp.dau.mil/docs/performance-of-defense-acquisition-system-2016.pdf. 
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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We applaud this initiative, because focusing on outcomes, rather than 
processes, is critical to successful procurement. As was its predecessors, the 
new (lengthy – 174 single-spaced pages) report is chock-full of intriguing 
observations and conclusions. The report begins with an attempt to dispel a 
number of common myths by explaining that:
• Cost control in defense acquisition programs has improved sig-
nificantly.
• Most major programs deliver the original baseline quantity or 
more. 
• The dynamics of cost estimates indicate that Operation and Sup-
port (O&S) costs are heavily driven by external inflation factors.
• High-level requirements seldom change on major programs, and 
very few programs have many changes. In other words, program 
requirements are more stable than you think.
• DoD acquisition can be timely and responsive. 
• Contracting processes are generally fair, rigorous, and objective—
and protests are rarely sustained. (If you didn’t know this, you 
are probably attending this conference for the first time, and you 
skipped yesterday’s sessions.)
• Major defense companies remain profitable despite the DoD’s 
increased success at tying profits to performance. 
• The system is not broken. Instead, the acquisition system for decades 
has given the United States the most capable military in the world 
and has been improving both in the past and more recently.
Frankly, we think it’s worth the energy it takes for DoD to write – and at-
tempt to demonstrate – the truth of these propositions. Someday, we hope 
that GAO will join in the enterprise. We also enjoyed the additional insights 
highlighted by the report. Some of our favorites included:
• The lack of programs in DoD’s “new product pipeline” may be put-
ting technological superiority at risk.
• Be particularly careful to ensure realistic program baselines—es-
pecially when budgets are tight.
• Be prepared to incur statutory overrun penalties. 
• Listen to feedback from the DoD’s professional acquisition leader-
ship.
• Focusing on acquisition fundamentals and cost control makes a 
difference. 
• Don’t neglect suitability (reliability, maintainability, etc.) in pursu-
ing system performance.
• Use fixed-price contracting judiciously in development.
We hope that Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) Frank Kendall’s successor (whether under the old 
or new organization) continues this annual performance assessment report-
ing enterprise. Ultimately, information is power. As noted in his principles 
article, discussed below, outside of Frank Kendall’s door appears the sign: “In 
God We Trust; All Others Must Bring Data.” We hope the sign remains long 
after Frank’s departure.
NOTES
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D.  A Better Buying Power (BBP) Legacy? Better Buying Power, which 
now has progressed from its unnumbered introduction through version 3.0, 
has likely run its course.  Among other initiatives in BBP, we hope that the 
new administration moves quickly to jettison the independent research and 
development (IR&D) initiatives. See, e.g., PSC Asks DoD to Suspend Work on 
Proposed IR&D Regulations, http://www.pscouncil.org/News2/NewsReleas-
es/2016/PSC_Asks_DoD_to_Suspend_Work_on_Proposed_IRD_regulations.
aspx; Proposed DFARS Rule Could Lead To Uniform Evaluation Of IR&D 
Costs, 58 GC ¶ 407 (suggests the rulemaking was premature; and “this may 
be an answer looking for a problem, rather than an actual problem”; fears of 
misuse of IR&D costs are “overblown,” current cost accounting rules already 
address the concerns, and “there is no evidence that such behavior is common 
in the defense industry”); DFARS Final Rule Requires IR&D ‘Technical Inter-
changes’, 58 GC ¶ 406; ABA Section Urges Withdrawal Of DFARS Proposed 
Rule On Future IR&D Expenses, 58 GC ¶ 157; Industry Urges Withdrawal 
Of DFARS Rule On Future IR&D Expenses, 58 GC ¶ 134. More broadly, we 
will be curious to see what future, if any, there is for “should cost” analysis 
as currently implemented.
On a more positive note, BBP may have left behind an unexpectedly 
useful legacy. Early in 2016, we were intrigued to read Frank Kendall’s 
short article, Better Buying Power Principles-What Are They?, UsDat&L 
maGazIne (Jan-Feb 2016), http://dau.dodlive.mil/2015/12/28/better-buying-
power-principles-what-are-they/. Kendall explained that, not surprisingly, 
stakeholders frequently asserted that their decisions were guided by “BPP 
principles.” This left Kendall perplexed, since no BBP guiding principles had 
even been articulated, much less published. We appreciate Kendall’s irony. But 
any humor here is tempered by a deep-seeded frustration that an initiative 
of this scale and complexity advanced so far without deriving from, or rely-
ing on, clearly articulated principles to begin with. Still, unlike many of the 
disconnected and all-too-often unproductive BBP initiatives, there is much 
to recommend in the BBP principles document. Kendall’s ten principles are: 
1. Continuous improvement will be more effective than radical 
change.
2. Data should drive policy. 
3. Critical thinking is necessary for success; fixed rules are too con-
straining. 
4. Controlling life-cycle cost is one of our jobs; staying on budget isn’t 
enough. 
5. People matter most; we can never be too professional or too com-
petent. 
6. Incentives work—we get what we reward. 
7. Competition and the threat of competition are the most effective 
incentives. 
8. Defense acquisition is a team sport. 
9. Our technological superiority is at risk and we must respond. 
10. We should have the courage to challenge bad policy. 
We encourage future DoD leaders and policymakers to begin with these 
principles, rather than the overwhelming BBP 3.0 briefing slide or background 
documentation, as a useful rubric for considering meaningful improvements to 
9-6
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defense acquisition. (As an academic exercise, we challenge you to correlate the 
principles with the BBP initiatives. See the DoD Acquisition Performance As-
sessment document, below, pages 139-142. We think it’s a fascinating exercise.)
IV. FROM PRINCIPLES TO OBSTACLES: PERCEPTIONS OF  
ACQUISITION LEADERS
Regular attendees know that this review has consistently and prominently 
featured the Professional Services Council Acquisition Policy Surveys. The 
PSC survey of acquisition experts and leaders historically has, for more than 
a decade, “probed on a[n interconnected] set of five core topics currently affect-
ing federal acquisition: workforce, budget, communications and collaboration, 
access to innovation, and oversight and compliance.”  The 2016 survey, true to 
form, is instructive, primarily because it includes the opinion of a broad and 
experienced cross-section of knowledgeable practitioners. Biennial Federal 
Acquisition Survey Finds Oversight, Workforce Challenges, 58 GC ¶ 221. The 
new administration would be well served to read the full report and consider, 
among other things:
• Acquisition Workforce. If you are reading these materials, we do 
not need to convince you that successful contracting outcomes depend upon 
people. And for too long, the government has not paid sufficient attention to 
this fundamental cog in the acquisition wheel. (See also, CRS Surveys DOD 
Acquisition Workforce Hiring Flexibilities, 58 GC ¶ 431; DOD Acquisition 
Workforce Grows, But Challenges Persist, 58 GC ¶ 275 (“many observers believe 
that DOD still faces significant challenges in improving the performance of 
the workforce”); Defense Acquisition Workforce Growth Goals Need Updat-
ing, GAO Says, 58 GC ¶ 4.) Still, possibly the most positive tidbit in the PSC 
report is that most interviewees concluded that the government’s acquisition 
workforce had not gotten worse over the last two years. That’s not a ringing 
endorsement, but, after more than a quarter-century of under-investment in 
the federal acquisition workforce, we’re identifying it as a step in the right 
direction. 
• With regard to specific skills, the lion’s share of respondents 
concluded that the workforce struggled with developing detailed 
requirements and scopes of work. That’s important, given that no 
amount of compliance training (focused on following rules) can 
close that skill gap.
• We were intrigued by the respondents’ perception that government 
acquisition personnel’s critical thinking and negotiating skills 
were stagnating or under-developed. At the same time, we were 
sympathetic with the perception that “There is simply not enough 
time or experienced personnel to do everything that we need … 
or want to do. We need more people who are capable of critical 
thinking and they must be allowed time needed to [think].”
• The survey, unsurprisingly, focused on the generational divide 
found in most workplaces today. Respondents also noted that: “on-
going retirements mean new hires do not benefit from mentoring 
and on-the-job training at the hands of their more experienced 
colleagues, [even though that is] a critical component in gaining 
a grasp of the full spectrum of acquisition[.]” We were encouraged 
by the discussion of rotational assignments, succession planning, 
and leadership development, all of which have received insufficient 
attention for decades.
9-7
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• Sadly, there’s not much help on the way, as hiring remains “ex-
tremely difficult.” “Even if an agency can attract qualified candi-
dates to an acquisition position and compensate them sufficiently 
to compete with the private sector, the federal hiring process 
simply takes too long and makes it too difficult to get the right 
people in the right place.”
• Budget. Not surprisingly, respondents generally agreed that budget 
uncertainty was now the status quo, they did not expect short-term improve-
ments, and that “[b]udget instability exacerbates the capacity issue.” Re-
spondents noted that their strategies for dealing with budgetary uncertainty 
included the use of bridge contracts, greater reliance on IDIQ vehicles, and 
supposed cost saving mechanisms, such as Low Price Technically Acceptable 
(LPTA) competitions. See, generally, Defense Secretary Calls For Budget 
Stability, Flexibility In Acquisition Process, 58 GC ¶ 101 (“Congress should 
address sequestration to create stability in the defense budget and provide … 
greater flexibility in starting acquisition programs.... [DOD] “would welcome 
greater flexibility in appropriations or reprogramming to initiate development 
of urgently needed capabilities[.]”).
• Impediments to Communication and Collaboration. 
• We believe that contracts – like any relationship – depend upon 
open and meaningful communication between the buyer and seller. 
Although respondents reported observing only limited progress 
with regard to the free flow of important information between 
business partners, many respondents were optimistic that things 
may improve in the future. (Sadly, it seems that former OFPP 
Administrator Daniel Gordon’s Myth Busting campaign – which 
numerous respondents had never heard of – has had negligible 
impact on fundamental behavioral changes, but maybe it’s just 
taking longer than expected. We note with approval the re-issuance 
of some Myth Busters – see, for example, Lesley A. Field, “Myth-
busting 3”: Further Improving Industry Communication with 
Effective Debriefings (January 5, 2017), available at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/memo/myth-
busting_3_further_improving_industry_communications_with_ef-
fectiv....pdf.) 
• The survey report devotes extensive coverage to a wide array of 
acquisition innovations – including GSA’s 18F, DIUx, Innovation 
Laboratories, Challenges, etc. – but many respondents remained 
skeptical “both in the government’s ability to innovate and whether 
the emphasis on innovation is warranted or even fully understood.” 
Respondents indicated that the most significant inhibitors to ob-
taining innovative solutions to meet their needs included agency 
workforce skills, fear of oversight or protests, and the FAR (or 
agency regulations). See also Defense Innovation Board Makes 
Interim Recommendations, 58 GC ¶ 363; Defense Secretary Unveils 
Defense Innovation Advisory Board, 58 GC ¶ 77; Experimentation, 
Agility Can Help Military Services Improve Acquisitions, Officials 
Testify, 58 GC ¶ 10.
• Oversight and Compliance. Consistent with past reports, respondents 
noted the substantial burden of oversight and compliance for both contractors 
and federal acquisition personnel. On a positive note, we were pleased that less 
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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fear was concentrated around the risk of prosecution, which would be a positive 
trend. (Granted, respondents did suggest that Inspectors General (IG) focused 
more on punishing supposed culprits than improving acquisitions.) Conversely, it 
was unnerving to be reminded that “more concern was expressed for the pace [of 
new compliance mandates] rather than their substance.” (See also our discussion, 
below, about cost-drivers.) Moreover, both government and industry appeared to 
agree on the requirements they viewed as most burdensome:
• the Congressionally-mandated inventory of services contractors, 
which some saw as primarily a political instrument; see also, GAO 
Questions Accuracy Of DOD Service Contracts Inventory, 58 GC  
¶ 392; DOD Services Contract Inventory Suffers From Incomplete, 
Inconsistent Data, 58 GC ¶ 197.
• overuse of Executive Orders, particularly with regard to labor and 
employment issues; see also, Final FAR Rule Limits Allowable 
Government Contractor Employee Compensation Costs, 58 GC  
¶ 368; DOL Final Rule Requires Contractors To Provide Paid Sick 
Leave, 58 GC ¶ 354; Industry Groups Urge Delay Of EO Target-
ing Labor Law Violators, 58 GC ¶ 347; Stephen McBrady, et al., 
Feature Comment: Preparing For Day-One Compliance With Fair 
Pay And Safe Workplaces, 58 GC ¶ 323; OFCCP Overhauls Sex 
Discrimination Guidelines, 58 GC ¶ 224; DOE Proposes Rule On 
Nondisplacement Of Qualified Workers Under Service Contracts, 
58 GC ¶ 159; ABA Section Suggests Clarifying DOL Sick Leave 
Rule, 58 GC ¶ 158; Industry Group Calls Proposed Sick Leave Rule 
‘Unreasonable,’ 58 GC ¶ 147; Industry Group Decries Labor Law 
Disclosure EO, 58 GC ¶ 90; House Committee Okays Bill To Roll 
Back Executive Action On Labor Agreements, 58 GC ¶ 25; Industry 
Groups Ask White House To Halt Contractor EOs, 57 GC ¶ 256, 
http://www.pscouncil.org/News2/NewsReleases/2015/Federal_Con-
tracting_Associations_Ask_White_House_to_Halt_Contractor_Ex-
ecutive_Actions.aspx. 
• executive compensation reporting - again, respondents questioned 
the value of executive compensation reporting to agencies and to 
acquisition outcomes; and 
• more generally, the never ending stream of data calls – with re-
spondents perceiving that much of the demanded data was never 
used.
• Disaggregation and Uniformity? We were surprised to see that 
a number of respondents favored consolidating procurement authority and 
systems. (We wonder if this isn’t nostalgia for April Fool’s day, 1984.) Oth-
ers called for further empowering or even reinventing OFPP. (More on that, 
below.)
V. IN UNCHARTED WATERS (OR, A CLEAN SLATE):  
PRELIMINARY ISSUES TO WATCH IN THE FIRST YEAR OF 
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
We readily admit that our government contracts-related crystal ball 
remains cloudy. Indeed, our sense is that your guess is as good as ours as 
to what comes next. Everyone seems to agree that the – now generational – 
government outsourcing trend will continue; the questions being not only 
whether it will accelerate, but more importantly: (1) whether the government 
NOTES
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can better define and actually measure the results it needs, and (2) whether 
it can assess and understand its own costs well enough to determine when 
outsourcing produces real solutions that provide value for money. Otherwise, 
we appear to be in “wait and see” mode. Nonetheless, here’s a handful of ad-
ditional issues we’ll be watching in 2017.
A. A De-Regulation Initiative? Most observers assume that the Repub-
lican-controlled Congress will – to some extent – reduce the volume of federal 
regulation and, closer to home, roll back at least some of the ever-increasing 
compliance burdens that define the federal procurement marketplace. At one 
point, the Trump Transition website promised “a temporary moratorium on 
all new regulation, canceling overarching executive orders and a thorough 
review to identify and eliminate unnecessary regulations that kill jobs and 
bloat government[.]” (Although, as of the New Year, we could no longer find the 
same language on the official transition website, www.GreatAgain.gov.) In our 
experience, this is much more difficult than anticipated, and we do not expect 
immediate, paradigm-shifting changes in our business practices and compliance 
programs. We do expect that the incoming administration will re-visit and con-
sider rolling back the tsunami of labor-related policies implemented by the 
Obama Administration through the FAR, Executive Orders, and Presidential 
Memoranda. (See the discussion of oversight and compliance, above and below.)
Environmentally Friendly (Or Green) Procurement has expanded 
dramatically under the Obama Administration. See, generally, FAR Part 23; 
Executive Order 13514 of October 5, 2009, Federal Leadership in Environmen-
tal, Energy, and Economic Performance; Executive Order (EO) 13693, Planning 
for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade (March 19, 2015); Presiden-
tial Memorandum of December 2, 2011, Implementation of Energy Savings 
Projects and Performance-Based Contracting for Energy Savings; Section 1 
of Presidential Memorandum of February 21, 2012, Driving Innovation and 
Creating Jobs in Rural America through Biobased and Sustainable Product 
Procurement; USDA BioPreferred Program, https://www.biopreferred.gov/
BioPreferred/, and a collection of related laws and rules at https://www.bio-
preferred.gov/BioPreferred/faces/pages/PoliciesAndLaws.xhtml. The Trump 
Administration has staked out a decidedly different tone than the Obama 
administration on environment-related issues. For example: “Rather than 
continuing the current path to undermine and block America’s fossil fuel 
producers, the Trump Administration will encourage the production of these 
resources by opening onshore and offshore leasing on federal lands and waters. 
We will streamline the permitting process for all energy projects, including 
… projects held up by President Obama, and rescind the job-destroying ex-
ecutive actions under his Administration. We will end the war on coal, and 
rescind the coal mining lease moratorium, the excessive Interior Department 
stream rule, and conduct a top-down review of all anti-coal regulations…. 
We will eliminate the highly invasive ‘Waters of the US’ rule, and scrap the 
$5 trillion dollar Obama-Clinton Climate Action Plan and the Clean Power 
Plan and prevent these unilateral plans from increasing monthly electric bills 
by double-digits without any measurable effect on Earth’s climate.” Trump 
Transition, https://greatagain.gov (see Energy Independence).
B.(1) Compliance, Overhead, and Cost-Drivers. We do hope that, 
regardless of any broader de-regulation initiative, DoD revisits the cost-
benefit issues associated with compliance, overhead, or cost-drivers. Attend-
ees understand that, despite its frustration with the (perceived as excessive) 
overhead rates that contractors charge, DoD remains largely powerless to 
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reduce the panoply of “cost drivers” that, in large part, derive from a never 
ending succession of Congressional mandates.  Less than two years ago, 
DoD published its disappointing and largely ineffective report on the BBP-
inspired initiative to address this issue. See, generally, Mark Husband & 
David J. Nicholls, Eliminating Requirements Imposed on Industry Where 
Costs Exceed Benefits (September 29, 2015), http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/
docs/Eliminating-Requirements-Imposed-on-Industry-Study-Report-2015.
pdf. There was reason for optimism, when DoD poignantly observed that: 
“Actions that are unnecessary or of little value for acquisition directly add 
costs, introduce delays in delivering capability, and bar innovative new en-
trants. Here, we examined several specific instances of regulatory burdens or 
their implementation imposed on industry in order to eliminate unnecessary 
or unproductive actions.” Alas, despite a promising aspiration, DoD took a 
formalistic, rather than a pragmatic (or results-oriented) approach, and, in 
doing so, defeated the purpose. The report explained that: 
“Unnecessary” and “unproductive” are the key adjectives here. 
Statute and regulation are not arbitrary but are designed 
to serve a purpose. The Department of Defense manages a huge 
taxpayer investment and must provide transparency for oversight to 
assess efficiency, fairness of the acquisition system, and compliance 
with broader national, social, and economic objectives. Additionally, 
many regulations are a response to previous acquisition failures 
and are intended to prevent recurrence. Attempts to save money by 
eliminating actions without considering these impacts/benefits are 
necessarily inappropriate. So, the central challenge of this work 
was to identify activities which could be eliminated with no 
or minimal impact on statutory or regulatory objectives.
We disagree and, rather, read that starting point as a prospective capitu-
lation. We think the question that needs to be asked is: whether the costs 
associated with individual statutes and regulations are worth it to 
the DoD customer? Could it be, with a more business-friendly executive 
and Republican-controlled Congress chomping at the bit to eliminate excess 
regulations, that DoD might try again? We certainly think so.
B.(2) The Elephant In The Room: Re-Assessing the Pervasive Compli-
ance Culture In Light of “Present Circumstances.” We are now, basically, a 
full decade into phase in which the balance between compliance and corruption 
control, on the one hand, and administrative efficiency and end-user outcomes, 
on the other, has tilted decisively toward compliance. As noted above, acquisition 
personnel often find that compliance concerns take precedence over serving their 
customers. A bumper crop of recoveries by DOJ’s Civil Frauds Unit last year will 
not help in restoring the balance. “[M]ore than $4.7 billion in settlements and 
judgments from civil cases involving fraud and false claims against the govern-
ment in fiscal year 2016 ... [represents] the third highest annual recovery in 
False Claims Act history[.]” https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016; DOJ Releases 
FY 2016 FCA Statistics, 58 GC ¶ 443. Only careful readers will appreciate that 
“$2.5 billion came from the health care industry ... [and t]he next largest recov-
eries came from the financial industry in the wake of the housing and mortgage 
fraud crisis...[, which] totaled nearly $1.7 billion[.]” In other words, procurement 
fraud recoveries were relatively minor in 2016. But don’t expect Congress to 
internalize that message. See, generally, Robert T. Rhoad, Matthew W. Turetzky, 
& Ariel E. Debin, Feature Comment: Weathering The Storm: Forecasts For FCA 
Enforcement In The Trump Era, 58 GC ¶ 413; Brian Tully McLaughlin, et al., 
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Substantial Increase In False Claims Act Penalties Impacts The Landscape Of 
Litigation, 58 GC ¶ 256 (among other things, “DOJ issued an interim final rule 
nearly doubling the penalty range for violations under the FCA.”); DOD Adjusts 
False Claims Penalties For Inflation, 58 GC ¶ 205.
And, of course, 2016 saw a steady stream of government contracts-related 
scandals. The Glenn Marine (“Fat Leonard”) Scandal won’t go away any time 
soon. Craig Whitlock, Navy Repeatedly Dismissed Evidence that ‘Fat Leonard’ 
was Cheating the 7th Fleet, WashInGton Post (December 27, 2016) (“Navy 
allowed the worst corruption scandal in its history to fester … by dismissing 
a flood of evidence that the rotund Asian defense contractor was cheating 
the service out of millions of dollars and bribing officers with booze, sex and 
lavish dinners”). Looking ahead: “Justice Department officials say there is 
no end in sight to the investigation and that 200 people [including some 30 
current or retired admirals] have fallen under scrutiny.” At the opposite end 
of the spectrum is a high-profile case in which a single contractor employee 
is enjoying the spotlight. Damian Paletta, Ex-NSA Contractor Stole at Least 
500 Million Pages of Records and Secrets, U.S. Says, WaLL street JoUrnaL 
(October 20, 2016) (former NSA contractor Hal Martin “amassed at least 500 
million pages of government records, including top-secret information about 
military operations, by stealing documents bit by bit over two decades”). And 
these are merely the tip of the iceberg.
At the same time, the incoming administration – specifically, the Presi-
dent and his family business partners – has raised more questions than it 
has answered with regard to what the community might expect in terms of 
the new administration’s compliance culture. Transparency advocates remain 
flummoxed that President Trump became the first modern-era major-party 
presidential nominee to refuse to release his or her tax returns. A vast web of 
personal (and family) business interests, and the inclusion of his children (and 
primary business partners) as active participants in the transition team led to 
a steady drum beat of calls for divestiture, creation of a blind trust, and other 
solutions. See, e.g., Alina Seluyk, NPR, aLL thInGs ConsIDereD, U.S. Ethics 
Chief Was Behind Those Tweets About Trump, Records Show (December 30, 
2016) (referencing, among others, tweets that read: “As we discussed with your 
counsel, divestiture is the way to resolve these conflicts[.]”). Cross-marketing 
of hotel properties during the campaign, and the enthusiasm of foreign states 
to host event at Trump hotels, have raised the public’s interest in the little 
known (and hard to pronounce) Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 1, cl. 8. Closer to home, at the time this goes to 
press, we are immensely curious as to whether a President will continue to 
hold and benefit from a high-profile hotel contract with the General Services 
Administration (GSA) in the Post Office Pavilion. See, generally, Steven L. 
Schooner & Daniel I. Gordon, GSA’s Trump Hotel Lease Debacle, Government 
exeCUtIve, http://www.govexec.com/excellence/promising-practices/2016/11/
gsas-trump-hotel-lease-debacle (noting, among other things, that the contract 
states that “No ... elected official of the Government of the United States ... 
shall be admitted to any share or part of this Lease, or to any benefit that 
may arise therefrom...”; the contract requires extensive annual financial dis-
closures and rent adjustment negotiations; the President appoints the GSA 
Administrator; etc.); Representative Elijah Cummings, et al., Letter to GSA 
Administrator Denise Turner Roth (December 14, 2016); Senators Elizabeth 
Warren & Tom Carper, Letter to GSA Administrator Denise Turner Roth 
(December 1, 2016); Representative Elijah Cummings, et al., Letter to GSA 
Administrator Denise Turner Roth (November 30, 2016).
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C. Re-Calibration of International Trade and Domestic Prefer-
ences. Trade featured prominently in the campaign, and time will tell if the 
U.S. will, in fact, relinquish its global leadership as an advocate for free trade. 
See, generally, FAR Part 25; GAO Compares Free Trade Agreements, 58 GC 
¶ 356. While there is a healthy appetite for domestic preferences (which, of 
course, means closing markets), the long-standing trade bargain depends 
upon reciprocity. Our sense is that the U.S. consumers desire (and, indeed, 
are addicted to) access to global goods at reasonable prices, and U.S. manu-
facturers desire the greatest access to export markets. Moreover, our sense 
is that, increasingly, the supply chain is truly global.
D. A Pro-Business Administration? Not So Fast. The incoming 
President prides himself as a successful businessman and entrepreneur, and 
the Republican-controlled Congress is historically deferential to private enter-
prise. Does all of this signal a more business-like, or at least business-friendly, 
atmosphere? Contrary to expectations, the post-election transition period was 
animated with tweets and public statements from the transition team suggest-
ing that the President might become unusually critical of, and uniquely active 
– or interventionist – with regard to, major acquisition programs, contracts, 
and other actions involving government contractors. Damian Paletta & Daniel 
Nasaw, Donald Trump Says He Will Personally Negotiate Air Force One Price 
With Boeing, WaLL street JoUrnaL (December 7, 2016); John D. McKinnon & 
Andrew Tangel, Trump Steps Up Criticism of Corporate America, WaLL street 
JoUrnaL (December 12, 2016) (“Mr. Trump also fired new jabs at corporations 
that benefit from lucrative government contracts ... [and] called for new rules 
to bar government officials from negotiating lucrative contracts with compa-
nies, and later accepting jobs with them.”); Doug Cameron & Damian Paletta, 
Donald Trump’s Tweet Sets Up Jet Dogfight, WaLL street JoUrnaL (December 
23, 2016) (“President-elect suggests a Boeing plane could be used as substitute 
for Lockheed’s F-35 combat jet”); Ben DiPietro, Trump Poses New Reputation 
Concerns for Companies, WaLL street JoUrnaL (December 27, 2016) (“discussing 
risk mitigation strategies after President Elect Trump singled out individual 
companies for criticism and the effect that has had on their stock prices”).
On the one hand, questioning, re-evaluating, and even terminating major 
system investments are critical executive functions. We are reminded that, 
among other things, the Presidential helicopter program was reined in, down-
scaled, cancelled, or (pick your preferred description,) restarted during the 
Obama administration, prompted by President Obama’s statement on national 
television that he thought the helicopter he had was “good enough.” By 2009, 
the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) breathed its last. And the conference’s 
more experienced generation will remember that, in 1991, during George Bush’s 
Presidency, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney cancelled (or directed the 
cancellation of) the future of Naval aviation, the A-12 stealth attack aircraft 
program (which, in turn, generated a lengthy (more than two decade) and 
historic level of largely unproductive litigation activity and appellate review).
On the other hand, the President rarely becomes personally involved 
in individual acquisition decisions. Moreover, our system is designed with 
concentrated authority residing with the contracting officer. See, generally, 
FAR Subpart 1.6. Moreover, the regulations assume that “contracting officers 
should be allowed wide latitude to exercise business judgment.” FAR 1.602-
2. And, of course, the courts periodically have expressed concern when that 
authority is not exercised as a result of, among other things, political pres-
sure. See, generally, McDonnell Douglas Corp. & General Dynamics Corp. v. 
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United States, 182 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“level of discretion that must 
be exercised by the government before terminating a contract for default is 
a question of law, which we review de novo”), reversing McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 358 (1996); Darwin Constr. Co. v. United 
States, 811 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Schlesinger v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 
571, 390 F.2d 702 (Cl. Ct. 1968) (“neither the contracting officer nor anyone 
else in the Navy exercised independent judgment in terminating the contract 
for default”; and “the contractor’s ‘bare’ or ‘technical’ default ‘served only as 
a useful pretext for the taking of action felt to be necessary on other grounds 
unrelated to the [contractor’s] performance....’”)
E. Wild Card: Public-Private Partnerships? The Trump Transition 
Team web page explains that: “the Trump Administration seeks to invest $550 
billion to ensure we can export our goods and move our people faster and safer. 
We will harness technology and make smarter decisions on how we build and 
utilize our infrastructure. Our roads, bridges, airports, transit systems and 
ports will be the envy of the world and enhance the lives of all Americans. 
We will build the roads, highways, bridges, tunnels, airports, and railways of 
tomorrow.” See https://greatagain.gov (see Transportation & Infrastructure 
page). In a vacuum, we encourage this kind of investment in infrastructure. 
We have reservations, however, given there appears no momentum to fund or 
actually pay for these critical investments. The Republican-controlled House 
of Representatives has expressed a lack of support for stimulus spending. The 
President elect suggested that the funding might come from bonds and later 
indicated that the administration would rely on “public-private partnerships, 
and private investments through tax incentives[.]” See, generally, Naomi Ja-
goda, Questions Hang over Trump Plan on Infrastructure, the hILL (December 
26, 2016). We find this approach intriguing, particularly to the extent that the 
U.S. federal government lags well behind most of the world and, indeed, many 
of the States in the U.S., in experimenting with and relying on public-private 
partnerships. See, generally, Public-Private Partnerships Not Widely Used 
By Agencies, GAO Finds, 58 CG ¶ 315, GAO-16-776R, Federal Real Property: 
Public-Private Partnerships Have a Limited Role in Disposal and Manage-
ment of Unneeded Property, available at www.gao.gov/assets/680/679352.pdf; 
Witnesses Promote Public-Private Competition At House Oversight Subcom-
mittee Hearing, 58 GC ¶ 250; World Bank Group, Public-Private-Partnership 
in Infrastructure Resource Center, at http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/overview/what-are-public-private-partnerships; Federal Highway 
Administration, Public Private Partnerships, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/ 
(including an interactive map of P3 concessions in the U.S.); National Council 
for Public-Private Partnerships, http://www.ncppp.org/. 
F. Also, Keep Your Eye On…. We are intrigued that, after the election, 
the market value of private prison contractor stocks rose. John Burnett, 
Will The Private Prison Business See A Trump Bump?, NPR: aLL thInGs Con-
sIDereD (January 4, 2017) (noting that “the week after Election Day, stocks 
of GEO and CoreCivic, the two biggest for-profit detention companies, shot 
up more than 20 and 40 percent, respectively”). “Detention is an inherent 
part of the machinery of deportation, and … we’re looking ahead at massive 
expansion of our detention system[; … and] what we’ve seen over the last 
decade is that when the detention system grows that’s mainly through the 
use of private prison companies.” Keep in mind that, earlier this year, DOJ 
publicly declared that it was ending its reliance on private prisons and put-
ting “the Department of Justice on a path to ensure that all federal inmates 
are ultimately housed at bureau facilities.” Deputy Attorney General Sally 
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Q. Yates, Reducing our Use of Private Prisons (August 18, 2016), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/phasing-out-our-use-private-prisons. 
VI. WHAT NEXT AT OFPP? 
As we go to press, we had heard nothing with regard to the future of the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), nor do we expect that to garner 
significant attention early in the new administration. The only early clue is 
that the Trump transition team announced that Mick Mulvaney, a Republican 
Representative from South Carolina, would be nominated to serve as Director 
of OMB (the Office of Management and Budget). Mulvaney’s initial statement 
suggested that: “The Trump administration will restore budgetary and fiscal 
sanity back in Washington after eight years of an out-of-control, tax and spend 
financial agenda, and will work with Congress to create policies that will be 
friendly to American workers and businesses[.]” Otherwise, Mulvaney “does not 
have a long record on IT issues, but his time in Congress suggests an interest 
in cutting spending, outsourcing to the private sector and shrinking the federal 
workforce by attrition.” Chase Gunter, Mulvaney’s Record Shows Tilt Toward 
Outsourcing, Cutting Federal Workforce, feDeraL ComPUter Week (December 
19, 2016), https://fcw.com/articles/2016/12/19/mulvaney-omb-gunter.aspx. 
We are optimistic that the new administration will seek to identify an 
experienced and forceful leader who, among other things, will support invest-
ment in the government acquisition workforce. (Such a leader, for example, 
must persuasively oppose freezing the acquisition workforce at its current 
level.) We hope to see a reinvigorated Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
responsible for more than managing the promulgation and implementation 
of collateral and compliance based rules, mandates, and record generation 
initiatives. Frankly, we think that the government’s approach to category 
management needs to be refocused on providing real benefits to buying 
agencies. (We also wonder whether GSA, rather than OFPP, might not be a 
more appropriate champion for the category management movement.) OFPP 
Proposes OMB Circular For Category Management, 58 GC ¶ 365; 81 Fed. Reg. 
69860 (Oct. 7, 2016); OFPP Appoints ‘Category Managers’ To Lead Procure-
ment Streamlining Initiative, 58 GC ¶ 75. 
Ultimately, we would love to see OFPP leading a government-wide con-
versation on, among other things:
• achieving outcomes rather than focusing on processes,
• how the government can obtain value for its money,
• generating customer satisfaction for end users and agency leadership,
• building productive and efficient relationships and lines of com-
munications between government customers and private sector 
institutions;
• reducing transaction costs and increasing purchasing speed,
• ensuring the highest standards of quality control,
• maintaining and sustaining critical aspects of the industrial base, 
and
• bringing common sense to the federal marketplace.
Hope springs eternal.
